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ABSTRACT
Objectives The study aims to evaluate the impact of the 
Revised Health Insurance Law 2014 on the utilisation of 
outpatient and inpatient care services, healthcare services 
utilisation at different levels of providers, types of providers 
and types of visits across different entitlement groups.
Design/setting Secondary data from two waves of the 
Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS) 2016, 
VHLSS 2014 were used. A cross- sectional study applying 
propensity score matching was conducted.
Participants A total of 4900 individuals who reported 
using healthcare services are analysed.
Outcomes measure Numbers of outpatient and inpatient 
visits, frequency of healthcare service utilisation at 
commune health stations, district hospitals, provincial 
hospitals, public and private health facilities, number of 
visits at health facility for medical treatment and health 
checks per year.
Results The result indicates that health insurance (HI) 
policy increased the number of outpatient visits for the 
enrolled between 0.87 and 1.29. The greatest impact 
was found on participants of heavily subsidised health 
insurance (HSHI) programmes with 1.29 visits per person 
per year. Similarly, an increase between 0.08 and 0.16 
in the number of inpatient admissions was because 
of participation in HI. With regard to type of healthcare 
providers, the study found that participation in HI has the 
most effect on the use of healthcare services at district 
hospitals. However, the study demonstrated that the 
impacts of HI on the increase in the frequency of visiting 
commune health stations, number of visits at the provincial 
hospital for HSHI groups, and number of visits at health 
facilities for health check and consultation were sensitive 
to unobserved characteristics.
Conclusion Our findings imply that policy- makers in 
Vietnam could continue expanding health insurance 
coverage to increase access to healthcare services for 
citizens, especially vulnerable groups. In addition, the 
government should draw more attention to primary 
healthcare level.
INTRODUCTION
Access to basic healthcare services plays an 
important role in the development of nations 
and the overall well- being of people. Health-
care is considered an essential need and also 
a basic human right.1 However, in low- income 
and middle- income countries (LMICs) where 
poverty and inequalities affect health status 
and hinder the provision of and access 
to healthcare, accessibility to healthcare 
services remains highly restricted.1 Accord-
ingly, LMICs’ governments have sought 
to accelerate progress towards Universal 
Health Coverage (UHC) by introducing and 
expanding non- profit health insurance (HI) 
schemes to increase healthcare coverage and 
financial protection.2 3
Vietnam has gained remarkable achieve-
ments in increasing HI coverage reaching 
above 85% in 2017.4 Although the HI 
coverage rate is high among high- income 
and low- income groups, including the civil 
servants and the poor, the figures for the 
Strengths and limitations of study
 ► This is the first comprehensive study to assess the 
impact of health insurance on healthcare utilisa-
tion patterns in Vietnam after the Revised Health 
Insurance Law 2014 has been introduced.
 ► The data are derived from the large population 
sample size—Vietnam Household Living Standard 
Survey (VHLSS), which can be regarded as repre-
sentative of the overall population. The findings can 
be generalised to the Vietnam population and pro-
vide valuable experience for other low- income and 
middle- income countries.
 ► The study used secondary data from the VHLSS 
survey; therefore, some factors would be useful for 
evaluating the impact of health insurance, such as 
supply- side factors, and health security was not in-
cluded in the dataset. There might also be recall bias 
related to self- reported data.
 ► Using the propensity score matching method to 
measure the causal effect, the estimated results 
may be biased if unobserved confounders affect 
both the outcome and treatment variables. Besides, 
the interval after the revision of the law may have 
been short to evaluate its impacts.
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informal sector and the near- poor are still low (figure 1). 
Reaching these groups is a major challenge for Vietnam, 
and they should be focused to achieve UHC by 2025.5
Vietnam is facing many challenges to achieve the goal 
of UHC by 2025. First, approximately 15% of the popula-
tion does not have any form of financial protection, such 
as HI. Most out- of- pocket health expenditures (OOP) 
are paid for inpatient medical services (55.8%) and self- 
medication (43.7%).5 6 Second, the rate of using HI cards 
among the insured when visiting health facilities is still 
modest, with 60%–70% for outpatient care and only 40% 
for inpatient admission in 2013, except for the insured 
of the poorest quintile group.6 The reason might be 
that before introducing the Revised Health Insurance 
Law in 2014, the insured must go to the medical facil-
ities specified on the insurance card; otherwise, they 
have to pay all medical expenses. As a result, patients 
with severe conditions often skip grassroots level facil-
ities and go directly to central or specialised hospitals 
without following the referral process, and do not use 
the HI card. Third, patients often visit private health 
facilities for outpatient care (about 34%), which are not 
covered by HI or do self- treatment.6 7 The reasons for this 
tendency can be long waiting time and attitude towards 
patients of health workers.8 Consequently, they might 
incur high OOP. Fourth, the rate of using healthcare 
services at a higher level of providers increases, whereas 
this rate tends to decrease at a lower level, leading to 
overcrowding at tertiary hospitals. In particular, the rate 
of outpatient services utilisation at hospitals in 2014 was 
43.1%, higher than the rate of 28.8% in 2006. The rate of 
inpatient visits at these facilities also increased, reaching 
85.7% in 2014, compared with 78.1% in 2006. However, 
the frequency of outpatient visits at commune health 
stations decreased from 25.9% in 2006 to 20.2% in 2014.9 
The barriers to low uptake of services at the grassroots 
level facilities are likely to be associated with the quality 
of medical services, equipment, lack of essential medi-
cines, and low qualifications of health workers.10 Last 
but not least, there is inequality in the pattern of visiting 
health facilities between rural and urban areas, between 
the rich and the poor, and ethnicity.7 Poor households of 
ethnic minorities are more likely to visit commune health 
stations than provincial hospitals (67% vs 2%). However, 
the non- poor frequently seek care at provincial/central 
hospitals (14%).7
Therefore, like many LMICs, Vietnam has approved 
HI as one of the possible options to achieve the UHC 
goal. In 2014, the Revised HI Law in Vietnam had been 
introduced and officially took effect from January 2015. 
Table 1 presents the summary of the Revised HI Law and 
its major changes.6 11 12
Although a large and growing body of literature has 
been done to examine the impact of HI on healthcare 
services utilisation in LMIC, findings from the studies 
are still inconsistent.13 The positive impact of HI on 
access and usage of medical services has been demon-
strated in the studies of Hangoma et al,14 Balamiento,1 
Zhao15 and Sparrow et al.16 However, the study on the 
impact of medical insurance for the poor in Georgia 
indicated that there was no impact of the programme 
on the utilisation of health services.17 Similarly, a study 
by Thornton et al about the effect of social security HI 
for the informal sector workers in Nicaragua found that 
there was no increase in the use of services among the 
newly insured.18 This inconsistency may be because these 
empirical studies were carried out in different settings 
with different health financing mechanisms and citizens' 
health- seeking behaviours.
In Vietnam, Wagstaff19 found that the HI programme 
for the poor had no impact on healthcare utilisation, while 
Sepehri et al20 investigated that the insured had a higher 
length of hospital stay than those without insurance. 
Also, Nguyen showed that voluntary health insurance 
Figure 1 Trends of health insurance coverage among different groups in Vietnam.5 6
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(VHI) increased outpatient and inpatient visits among 
the enrollees.21 Likewise, a recent study conducted by 
Nguyen found that there was a positive impact of student 
HI on the frequency of healthcare visits.22 However, these 
studies did not evaluate the effects of HI on healthcare 
utilisation at different levels of providers, type of providers 
and type of visits. In addition, although in Vietnam, a 
considerable amount of literature has been published on 
evaluating the impact of non- profit HI programmes on 
the utilisation of healthcare services, the research results 
are not always consistent.
To my knowledge, in Vietnam, until now, there has 
been no comprehensive study evaluating the impact of 
the Revised HI Law in 2014 on healthcare utilisation 
patterns, including frequency of outpatient and inpa-
tient visits, health facilities utilisation (community health 
centres, district hospital, public and private health facil-
ities) and types of visiting health facilities (treatment or 
Table 1 Health insurance of target groups in Vietnam after adopting revised HI Law
Target groups Description Premium and subsidies Co- payment rate
First group—contributions are made 
by employees and employers
 ► Employees with an indefinite term 
labour contract, and those signing 
labour contracts from 3 months or 
more
 ► Employers of enterprises
 ► Civil servants and public employees
4.5% of payroll tax (3% employers, 
1.5% employees)
20%
Second group—contributions are 
100% subsidised by the government
 ► People from poor households, and 
those from ethnic minority
 ► People living in areas with difficult 
socioeconomic conditions
 ► Meritorious people
 ► Children under 6 years old
 ► People serving in the army and the 
police
100% subsidy by the government 
(the premium contribution is equal to 
4.5% of the monthly salary, or 4.5% 
of minimum salary depending on each 
target group)
Reduced from 5% to 0%
(exempted from co- payment 
and are entitled to use free 
medical examination and 
treatment services)
Third group—contributions are partly 
subsidised by the government
 ► The near- poor Minimum subsidy level is 70% of 
minimum salary
Reduced from 20% to 5%
 ► Student Minimum subsidy level is 30% of 
minimum salary
20%
 ► Households working in agriculture, 
forestry, fishery with medium income
Minimum subsidy level is 50% of 
minimum salary
20%
Fourth group—contributions are paid 
by social insurance fund
 ► Retirees  ► 4.5% of monthly pension 20%
 ► People receiving monthly social 
insurance benefits due to labour 
accidents, occupational diseases
 ► 4.5% of minimum salary 20%
 ► Female employees are on leave 
during maternity regime
 ► 4.5% of the monthly salary before 
the maternity leave
20%
Fifth group—contributions are based 
on unit subscription of the family
Informal sector  ► The first person contributes a 
premium of 4.5% of minimum 
salary
 ► The second person pays 70% of 
the of the first person’s contribution
 ► The third person pays 60% of the 
first person’s contribution
 ► The fourth person contributes 50% 
of the first person’s contribution
 ► The fifth person pays 40% of the 
first person’s contribution
20%
Copayment rate when the insured 
go to health facilities without 
referral
District hospital
(inpatient treatment)
Provincial hospital
(inpatient treatment)
Central hospital
(inpatient treatment)
Before 2014 30% 40% 60%
After 2014 0% 40% 60%
  100% for outpatient care
Provider payment method
Capitation (application for primary health facilities).
Fee- for- service (FFS)—prevalent method in Vietnam.
Case- based diagnostic- related groups (DRGs)—being tested in several provinces.
Benefit health insurance package
 ► Medical examination, treatment and rehabilitation.
 ► Periodic pregnancy examination and delivery.
 ► Examination for screening and early diagnosis of some diseases.
 ► Transportation of patients who need to be transferred to the higher level of care.
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consultation and health check). Therefore, evaluating 
the HI policy effects on healthcare services utilisation for 
making recommendations to improve the HI scheme and 
strengthening the health system is imperative. Further-
more, findings from the present study might offer policy- 
makers not only in Vietnam but also in LMIC useful 
information to improve the HI scheme making health-
care services available and affordable to citizens, espe-
cially disadvantaged people.
METHODS
Sampling and data source
A cross- sectional study was conducted to assess the impact 
of the HI policy on the use of healthcare services. The 
study used the data from the Vietnam Household Living 
Standards Survey (VHLSS) 2016 and VHLSS 2014. The 
surveys were carried out every 2 years by the General 
Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO) with technical assis-
tance and funding from the World Bank. The VHLSS 
2014 included 9399 households and 35 920 individuals 
from 3130 communes. The VHLSS 2016 embraced 9399 
households with 35 793 individuals selected from 3133 
communes in which 50% of the enumeration areas were 
selected from the VHLSS 2014, and 50% were newly 
selected from the master sample. The pre- treatment 
(pre- programme) characteristics of the insured and non- 
insured were obtained from the VHLSS 2014, whereas 
the outcomes and treatment variables were derived from 
VHLSS 2016. I included only individuals who reported 
outpatient and/or inpatient visits in the last 12 months. 
Thus, the number of observations in this study reduced 
sustainably and included 4900 individuals.
The survey collected enormous information on 
households in Vietnam. However, in this study, we used 
data related to incomes and household expenditures, 
including expenses for food, clothing, accommodation, 
education, health and other expenses. Other informa-
tion such as demographic characteristics (age, gender, 
ethnicity, marital status); education; occupation; and 
electricity, water, and sanitary conditions were extracted 
from the survey. Data related to health status, health 
insurance enrolment of household members, number 
of outpatient and inpatient visits, and reasons for visiting 
different health facilities were also used.
Definition of variables
Control group includes individuals who are non- insured in 
2016.
Treatment groups
To evaluate whether the impacts of the HI scheme on a 
number of outcome variables are heterogeneous across 
the entitlement categories, and to lessen the possibility of 
mismatching, we divided the insured into two subgroups, 
classified as voluntary health insurance (VHI) subsample 
and heavily subsidised health insurance (HSHI) subsa-
mple (the poor, the near- poor, policy beneficiaries) based 
on the amendments of HI policy. Students’ VHI is not 
part of the VHI subsample. The full sample includes all 
individuals having HI. The treatment groups are those 
who have HI in 2016.
Outcome variables
I assess the HI scheme’s impact on the frequency of 
outpatient and inpatient visits. In addition, the study aims 
to point out whether amendments in HI policy, such as 
allowing admission at the tertiary level without a referral 
letter, affect the intensity of visiting health facilities at 
different providers’ levels. Also, the effect of the HI on the 
frequency of healthcare utilisation at public and private 
health facilities was evaluated. Besides, the study exam-
ines the impact of the scheme on types of visits, including 
the intensity of using medical facilities for treatment and 
health check- up.
Explanatory variables
To ensure that explanatory variables are exogenous with 
HI participation, the covariates in 2014 VHLSS were used 
instead of 2016 VHLSS—pre- treatment variables.21 23–25 
Explanatory variables should contain covariates which 
affect simultaneously the treatment (enrolment) status 
and the outcomes of interest.26
Explanatory variables including education level, age 
groups, sex, gender, marital status, ethnicity, occupa-
tion status, availability of clean water, electricity, access 
to toilet, household size, a household composition such 
as the number of children under 6 years of age and 
number of elderly are controlled for. Besides, expendi-
ture quintiles; HI status; the number of motorcycles, tele-
phones, radios, TVs or computers; and a residential area 
owned by households are selected. Importantly, illness 
status, number of illness times and days per year are also 
controlled in different specifications. In addition, covari-
ates include seven socioeconomic regions of Vietnam and 
places of residence (rural or urban). These control vari-
ables have been used in a large and growing volume of 
public studies.1 15 19 21 24 27–29 The definition of variables is 
provided in online supplemental appendix 1.
Statistical analysis
When evaluating policies, we encounter selection bias 
problems, which means that enrolment in HI scheme is 
not random for some groups such as the informal sector 
workers, the farmers, the elderly or the near- poor due 
to the voluntary nature per se of the programme.23 30 31 
There are confounding factors that may affect the partic-
ipation in HI. If these characteristics are systematically 
correlated with the outcome variables, it may lead to 
biased estimates.23 24 For instance, potential health risks, 
age and income can simultaneously affect demands for 
health services and health insurance enrolment.1 24 This 
may result in overestimation or underestimation of the 
impact of the HI programme. Although we do not face 
the self- selection problem in estimating the effect of the 
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HI programme on the poor, the assignment is not random 
because they are selected through predefined criteria.32
The effect of the HI scheme can be estimated by 
comparing the use of health services when people join HI 
and when they do not participate. However, it is difficult 
to estimate this effect in observational research because 
we do not know how the insured would have used medical 
services if they had not enrolled in HI. Accordingly, we 
employed the propensity score matching (PSM) method, 
which was introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin33 to 
address this problem. This method was applied in a 
number of studies such as Mebratie et al,24 Gustafsson- 
Wright et al,34 Palmer,35 Nguyen21 and Axelson et al.27 The 
PSM builds a statistical comparison group based on the 
likelihood of involving in the HI programme, depending 
on the observed traits.23 The idea of PSM is to find indi-
viduals not participating in the programme whose char-
acteristics are similar to those of the participants. These 
characteristics are not affected by the programme, for 
example, preprogramme characteristics.23 The PSM is 
based on two assumptions.
First, participation in the programme is completely 
based on observable features, which is called 
unconfoundedness23:
 
(
YTi , Y
C
i
)⊥Ti | Xi 
where  Ti  is treatment variable,  Ti = 1  if the individual 
participates in the HI programme,  Ti = 0  otherwise.  YTi  , 
 YCi   stand for outcome variables of interest for the enrolled 
(treatment group) and the non- enrolled (control group); 
 Xi  presents covariates affecting both self- selection and 
outcome variables.
The second assumption is common support, which is 
the area where the propensity scores of both the treatment 
group and control group are estimated. It is assumed that 
the probability of enrolment, conditional on the covari-
ates X belongs to 0 and 1,  0 < P
(
Ti = 1 |Xi
)
< 1 .
23 Every 
enrolled individual will be compared with the corre-
sponding non- enrolled which has the same propensity 
scores; then the average difference in outcomes between 
two groups is calculated to determine the impact of the 
policy. This effect is the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT). The ATT can be defined as follows23:
 ATTPSM = EP
(
X
)
|T=1
{
E
[
YTi |Ti = 1, P
(
X
)]− E [YCi |Ti = z, P (X)]} (1)
where  P
(
X
)
  represents propensity scores, given 
the observed characteristics of participants and non- 
participants, which are estimated from logit regression in 
this study.
Supposed that ATT on the number of outpatient visits 
is 1.25, we can interpret that after matching treated and 
control individuals, the HI programme’s effect is to 
increase the number of outpatient visits by 1.25. In other 
words, people who participate in HI make greater outpa-
tient care use than those who did not enrol in the HI 
programme.
The World Bank suggests that, identically, to calcu-
late the propensity score and match the participants 
and non- participants based on the propensity score, 
pre- programme data should be used.23 Therefore, pre- 
programme baseline data (VHLSS 2014) on the insured 
and non- insured were used to calculate the propensity 
scores and match them. I used different matching esti-
mators to check the robustness of estimation results, 
including nearest- neighbour matching (NN), kernel 
matching and radius calliper matching. The calliper was 
determined by dividing the SD of the propensity score by 
4.36 I used the bandwidths of 0.04, which was applied in 
the study of Palmer for this study.35
STATA software (V.14) was used to extract, merge data 
and estimate results.
Patient and public involvement
Patients were not involved in this study.
RESULTS
Estimated effects of health insurance reform on healthcare 
utilisation outcomes
The descriptive statistics and the means comparison tests 
between the insured and the uninsured regarding charac-
teristics that may affect both the probability of enrolling 
in different HI programmes and the outcome variables 
are provided in table 2. Descriptive statistics showed 
significant differences in a number of factors across 
the participating and non- participating HI groups. The 
statistical description of patterns in utilisation of health 
services at different health facilities for the non- insured 
group and different HI subsamples of interest is provided 
in table 3. Similarly, there were also differences in a range 
of outcome variables across different groups.
To calculate the propensity scores, I estimated the 
factors affecting the probability of enrolling in the HI 
scheme by using a logit model for different treatment and 
control groups (online supplemental appendix 2). The 
results indicated that variables influencing the probability 
of joining the HI programme varied depending on the 
treatment subsamples. In general, age, gender, ethnicity, 
marital status, education level, occupation, household 
size, household composition, expenditure, assets, number 
of illness days and place of residence were factors deter-
mining the odds of participating in the HI scheme.
Table 4 shows the ATTs of the HI scheme for a range 
of outcomes across different subpopulations. There was 
a statistically significant positive impact of the policy on 
the frequency of using outpatient health services across 
all subpopulations. The estimated results showed that the 
HI policy increased the number of outpatient visits for 
the enrolled between 0.87 and 1.29. The greatest impact 
was found on participants of HSHI programmes with 
1.29 visits per person per year (with NN matching). Simi-
larly, an increase between 0.08 and 0.16 in the number 
of inpatient admissions was because of participation in 
HI. The largest increase in the frequency of using inpa-
tient care services among the insured of the poor, near- 
poor or policy beneficiaries was due to the policy (0.16 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics across different treatment and control groups before matching
Variables
The non- insured
(control group)
N=760
(1)
The insured of VHI subsample
(treatment group)
N=1022
(2)
The insured of heavily subsidised 
subsample
(treatment group)
N=1209
(3)
The insured of full sample
(treatment group)
N=4140
(4)
n % n %
P value
H0: (2)=(1) n %
P value
H0: (3)=(1) n %
P value
H0: (4)=(1)
Age Mean 44.7 SD
16.2
Mean 53.3 SD
14.6
0.000 Mean 53.9 SD
21.8
0.000 Mean 42.1 SD
25.6
0.006
Age group 0.000 0.000 0.000
  ≤30 124 16.3 66 6.5 171 14.1 1318 31.8
  31–40 173 22.8 123 12.0 120 9.9 405 9.8
  41–50 196 25.8 223 21.8 159 13.2 560 13.5
  51–60 152 20.0 294 28.8 249 20.6 765 18.5
  ≥61 115 15.1 316 30.9 510 42.2 1092 26.4
Gender (male) 307 40.4 331 32.4 0.000 504 41.7 0.570 1669 40.3 0.967
Ethnicity (Kinh and Hoa) 727 95.7 999 97.8 0.012 952 78.7 0.000 3577 86.4 0.000
Marital status (married) 559 78.8 809 79.2 0.861 780 64.5 0.000 2369 57.2 0.000
Education level 0.654 0.000 0.000
  Not complete primary school 230 30.3 329 32.2 558 46.2 1828 44.2
  Primary school 205 27.0 266 26.0 290 24.0 850 20.5
  Lower secondary 222 29.2 268 26.2 208 17.2 669 16.2
  Upper secondary 51 6.7 80 7.8 64 5.3 250 6.0
  Vocational school 38 5.0 57 5.6 62 5.1 289 7.0
  College, University, Master, PhD 14 1.8 22 2.2 27 2.2 254 6.1
Occupation status 0.000 0.000 0.000
  Leaders/managers 0 0 1 0.1 5 0.4 32 0.8
  Professionals/technicians 11 1.5 19 1.9 9 0.7 177 4.3
  Service and sales staff 114 15.0 177 17.3 89 7.4 350 8.5
  Labourers in agriculture/forestry/
fishery
83 10.9 110 10.8 118 9.8 279 6.7
  Manual labourers and machine 
operators
113 14.9 97 9.5 57 4.7 283 6.8
  Unskilled workers 291 38.3 341 33.4 502 41.5 1180 28.5
  Others 148 19.5 277 27.1 429 35.5 1839 44.4
Household size Mean 3.97 SD
1.5
Mean 3.93 SD
1.6
0.617 Mean 3.83 SD
1.86
0.067 Mean 4.1 SD
1.7
0.081
Household composition
  Share of children below 6 years old Mean 
7.4%
SD
13.0%
Mean
6.1%
SD
11.2%
0.006 Mean 7.4% SD
11.9%
0.382 Mean 
10.2%
SD
14.1%
0.000
  Share of the elder above 60 years 
old
Mean 
12.4%
SD
25.1%
Mean
21.60%
SD
31.2%
0.000 Mean
30.5%
SD
37.6%
0.000 Mean 20.8 SD
31.7
0.000
Access to clear water 582 76.6 855 83.7 0.000 775 64.1 0.000 3093 74.7 0.274
Toilet access 524 68.9 806 78.9 0.000 626 51.8 0.000 2815 68.0 0.605
Expenditure quintiles 0.000 0.000 0.000
  First expenditure quintile group 
(poorest)
131 17.2 129 12.6 444 36.7 852 20.6
  Second expenditure quintile group 196 25.8 191 18.7 230 19.0 781 18.9
  Third expenditure quintile group 167 22.0 229 22.4 201 16.6 815 19.7
  Fourth expenditure quintile group 159 20.9 221 21.6 170 14.1 819 19.8
  Fifth expenditure quintile group 
(richest)
107 14.1 252 24.7 164 13.6 873 21.1
No of motorcycles Mean 1.3 SD
0.84
Mean
1.5
SD
0.88
0.001 Mean 1.0 SD
0.85
0.000 Mean 1.34 SD
0.89
0.572
No of telephones Mean 1.7 SD
1.0
Mean
1.9
SD
1.1
0.000 Mean 1.4 SD
1.1
0.000 Mean 1.8 SD
1.1
0.109
No of radios, TVs or computers Mean 1.2 SD
0.5
Mean
1.4
SD
0.8
0.000 Mean 1.1 SD
0.6
0.013 Mean 1.3 SD
0.76
0.000
Continued
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in the NN matching algorithm). The figure was also high 
for the VHI group. However, the impact was not statisti-
cally significant for the entire sample, except for the NN 
matching estimator.
Furthermore, the magnitude of HI’s impact on health-
care utilisation at different providers varied from the 
VHI to the HSHI group and the group of participants 
of different HI programmes (full sample). For example, 
the HI programme contributed to increases of 0.92 in the 
number of visits at district hospitals for the VHI group, 
and 0.64 for the full sample (NN matching). While the 
HI increased the number of visits at provincial hospitals 
for the VHI group by 0.55 times per person per year, this 
figure for the HSHI group was 0.20 (radius matching). 
The HI programme increased the frequency of use of 
services at commune health stations among the HSHI 
group more than other groups (0.53 in kernel and 
radius matching). Concerning the type of providers, the 
policy resulted in a substitution effect, which means that 
the decline of from 0.39 to 0.51 in frequency of visiting 
Variables
The non- insured
(control group)
N=760
(1)
The insured of VHI subsample
(treatment group)
N=1022
(2)
The insured of heavily subsidised 
subsample
(treatment group)
N=1209
(3)
The insured of full sample
(treatment group)
N=4140
(4)
n % n %
P value
H0: (2)=(1) n %
P value
H0: (3)=(1) n %
P value
H0: (4)=(1)
Total residential area (m2) Mean 81.2 SD
45.1
Mean
90.4
SD
59.2
0.000 Mean 74.0 SD
45.9
0.000 Mean 84.4 SD
53.9
0.128
Illness status in last 12 months 85 11.2 209 20.4 0.000 289 23.9 0.000 759 18.3 0.000
No of illness times in last 12 months Mean 0.16 SD
0.55
Mean 0.36 SD
0.9
0.000 Mean 0.5 SD
1.4
0.000 Mean 0.34 SD
1.08
0.000
No of illness days in last 12 months Mean 1.52 SD
9.82
Mean
5.05
SD
24.8
0.000 Mean 4.98 SD
14.4
0.000 Mean 4.38 SD
19.7
0.000
Place of residence (urban) 193 25.4 366 35.8 0.000 179 14.8 0.000 1243 30.0 0.010
Region 0.364 0.000 0.000
  Red River Delta 145 19.1 190 18.6 201 16.6 788 19.0
  Northern Midlands and Mountains 41 5.4 75 7.3 191 15.8 607 14.7
  North and South Central Coast 138 18.2 196 19.2 340 28.1 885 21.4
  Central Highlands 51 6.7 58 5.7 71 5.9 240 5.8
  South East 80 10.5 123 12.0 74 6.1 470 11.4
  Mekong River Delta 305 40.1 380 37.2 332 27.5 1150 27.8
Table 2 Continued
Table 3 Descriptive statistics of outcome variables across different groups
Outcome variables
(in last 12 months)
The non- insured
(1)
The insured of VHI 
subsample
(2)
The insured of heavily 
subsidised subsample
(3)
The insured of full sample
(4)
Mean SD Mean SD
P value
H0: (2)=(1) Mean SD
P value
H0: (3)=(1) Mean SD
P value
H0: (4)=(1)
No of outpatient visits 2.507 2.395 3.878 4.791 0.000 3.415 4.642 0.000 3.164 4.052 0.000
No of inpatient visits 0.132 0.537 0.266 0.785 0.000 0.373 1.128 0.000 0.271 0.858 0.000
No of visits at commune health 
station
0.192 0.720 0.330 1.550 0.023 0.828 2.353 0.002 0.589 1.788 0.000
No of visits at district hospital 0.393 1.343 1.612 4.073 0.000 1.370 3.443 0.000 1.082 3.052 0.000
No of visits at provincial hospital 0.418 1.490 1.063 2.730 0.000 0.692 2.176 0.000 0.752 2.236 0.000
No of visits at state health 
facilities
0.834 1.923 2.758 4.551 0.000 2.178 3.939 0.000 1.930 3.622 0.000
No of visits at private health 
facilities
1.447 2.134 0.855 2.544 0.000 0.601 1.937 0.000 0.764 2.132 0.000
No of visits at health facility for 
medical treatment
2.222 2.505 3.503 4.715 0.000 3.079 4.819 0.000 2.702 4.085 0.002
No of visits at health facility for 
health check and consultation
0.329 1.027 0.574 2.151 0.004 0.664 1.920 0.000 0.589 1.866 0.000
No of observations 760 1022 1209 4140
VHI, voluntary health insurance.
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Table 4 Estimated average treatment effects on the treated (ATTs) of HI scheme on healthcare utilisation across different 
samples with PSM method in Vietnam
Outcome variable
(in last 12 months)
Matching 
algorithm
VHI subsample Heavily subsidised subsample Full sample
ATT 95% CI ATT 95% CI ATT 95% CI
No of outpatient visits NN 0.991***
(0.214)
0.629 to 1.639 1.289***
(0.266)
0.715 to 1.410 0.897***
(0.188)
0.630 to 1.013
Kernel 1.199***
(0.193)
0.843 to 1561 1.179***
(0.197)
0.830 to 1.704 0.859***
(0.141)
0.953 to 1.560
Radius 1.177***
(0.190)
0.750 to 1.629 1.173***
(0.196)
0.855 to 1.363 0.866***
(0.145)
0.826 to 1.365
No of inpatient visits NN 0.127***
(0.034)
0.035 to 0.269 0.156***
(0.058)
−0.014 to 0.271 0.112***
(0.041)
0.061 to 0.304
Kernel 0.107***
(0.037)
0.019 to 0.171 0.082*
(0.045)
0.011 to 0.259 0.051
(0.031)
0.008 to 0.225
Radius 0.106***
(0.036)
0.756 to 0.188 0.083*
(0.044)
0.087 to 0.226 0.041
(0.032)
0.097 to 0.362
No of visits at commune 
health station
NN 0.170***
(0.069)
−0.024 to 0.268 0.310***
(0.079)
0.466 to 0.726 0.209***
(0.055)
0.403 to 0.506
Kernel 0.123**
(0.061)
0.021 to 0.245 0.527***
(0.080)
0.391 to 0.738 0.414***
(0.047)
0.399 to 0.695
Radius 0.129**
(0.060)
0.022 to 0.286 0.528***
(0.079)
0.433 to 0.719 0.417***
(0.048)
0.498 to 0.672
No of visits at district 
hospital
NN 0.920***
(0.161)
0.619 to 1.394 1.019***
(0.167)
0.821 to 1.146 0.641***
(0.107)
0.445 to 0.697
Kernel 1.075***
(0.145)
0.728 to 1.380 0.863***
(0.129)
0.656 to 1.049 0.627***
(0.085)
0.634 to 1.001
Radius 1.086***
(0.144)
0.869 to 1.471 0.868***
(0.129)
0.788 to 1.082 0.617***
(0.087)
0.783 to 1.148
No of visits at provincial 
hospital
NN 0.476***
(0.122)
0.421 to 0.829 0.308***
(0.128)
0.126 to 0.426 0.367***
(0.102)
0.022 to 0.489
Kernel 0.567***
(0.114)
0.369 to 0.931 0.209*
(0.108)
0.026 to 0.422 0.221***
(0.085)
0.017 to 0.488
Radius 0.548***
(0.112)
0.136 to 0.931 0.202*
(0.108)
0.036 to 0.367 0.193*
(0.088)
0.067 to 0.445
No of visits at state health 
facilities
NN 1.455***
(0.192)
1.159 to 2.167 1.321***
(0.197)
0.756 to 1.667 1.085***
(0.141)
0.767 to 1.164
Kernel 1.669***
(0.173)
1.095 to 1.998 1.162***
(0.162)
0.724 to 1.544 0.916***
(0.116)
0.932 to 1.680
Radius 1.661***
(0.171)
1.262 to 2.205 1.160***
(0.162)
0.854 to 1.511 0.879***
(0.119)
1.021 to 1.565
No of visits at private health 
facilities
NN −0.475***
(0.146)
−0.919 to −0.032 −0.448***
(1.415)
−0.676 to −0.484 −0.433***
(0.125)
−0.702 to −0.357
Kernel −0.482***
(0.134)
−0.853 to −0.279 −0.474***
(0.139)
−0.632 to −0.244 −0.426***
(0.117)
−0.532 to −0.311
Radius −0.511***
(0.130)
−0.788 to −0.189 −0.473***
(0.138)
−0.779 to −0.464 −0.395***
(0.121)
−0.796 to −0.316
No of visits at health facility 
for medical treatment
NN 0.838***
(0.211)
0.495 to 1.819 1.233***
(0.271)
0.779 to 1.306 0.800***
(0.191)
0.341 to 0.855
Kernel 1.074***
(0.195)
0.551 to 1.313 0.901***
(0.205)
0.727 to 1.376 0.634***
(0.147)
0.537 to 1.623
Radius 1.031***
(0.191)
0.702 to 1.377 0.889***
(0.204)
0.825 to 1.121 0.636***
(0.151)
0.567 to 1.225
No of visits at health facility 
for consultation and health 
check
NN 0.240***
(0.101)
0.025 to 0.382 0.231**
(0.098)
0.231 to 0.519 0.157**
(0.074)
0.312 to 0.334
Kernel 0.338***
(0.219)
0.112 to 0.378 0.362***
(0.083)
0.210 to 0.472 0.243***
(0.061)
0.215 to 0.569
Radius 0.238***
(0.083)
0.149 to 0.489 0.364***
(0.083)
0.234 to 0.440 0.238***
(0.063)
0.264 to 0.448
Observations   Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control
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private health facilities among the insured transferred 
to the growth between 0.88 and 1.70 in their intensity 
of seeking medical services at public facilities. This shift 
was pronounced among participants of VHI, followed by 
the HSHI group. In terms of types of visits, the policy was 
responsible for significant increases from 0.84 to 1.07 in 
the number of visits for medical treatment among VHI 
participants and about 0.89–1.23 among the participants 
of HSHI programmes. The increased trend was held 
for the number of health facilities visits to do health 
checks, which fluctuated around 0.2 across different HI 
participants.
The quality of the matching process and robustness 
were checked. The results showed that across different 
matching algorithms there were sharp reductions in stan-
dardised mean bias ranging between 69.54% and 86.14% 
(online supplemental appendix 3). Besides, the hypoth-
esis H0 for no systematic difference in the distribution 
of covariates between the treatment and control groups 
after matching was not rejected for VHI and HSHI subsa-
mples with different matching algorithms, and for the full 
sample with NN matching. In addition, the t- tests for the 
balance of means that matched the treated and untreated 
groups in VHI and HSHI subsamples showed insignifi-
cant differences for most of the covariates (online supple-
mental appendix 4).
I calculated Rosenbaum bounds to check the sensitivity 
of results, which determines the strength of the unob-
servable heterogeneity that might affect the estimation 
results.31 Rosenbaum boundary estimation results are 
shown in online supplemental appendix 5. Our results 
were generally robust except for the ATTs on outcomes 
of the number of visits at commune health stations and 
the number of visits at health facilities for health check 
for some groups. Likewise, under the outcome of the 
number of outpatient visits, the ATTs were uncertain for 
the full sample. Similarly, there was hidden bias in the 
ATTs of the number of visits at the provincial hospital for 
the HSHI subsample.
DISCUSSION
This study examined the impact of the Revised HI Law 2014 
on the use of healthcare services among different entitle-
ment groups. The results showed that the HI scheme had 
a positive effect on healthcare utilisation. However, the 
magnitude of influence on outpatient and inpatient care, 
types of providers and types of visits was heterogeneous. 
It was also different between VHI and HSHI groups. The 
programme has affected the use of outpatient services 
more than the use of inpatient services. The programme 
most affected the use of health services at the district 
level. In terms of using health services at hospitals, the 
HI scheme had a higher effect on the VHI group than 
the HSHI group. Concerning the type of providers, the 
policy had a positive impact on using public health facili-
ties while reducing the frequency of private health facility 
utilisation.
In particular, the result indicated that the HI scheme 
was estimated to increase the use of both outpatient and 
inpatient services for VHI, HSHI groups, and full sample. 
This finding is consistent with that of Balamiento, who 
found that the Indigent HI programme for the poor in 
the Philippines increases the likelihood of outpatient 
visits by 5.2 to 6.6 percentage points, and inpatient 
admissions by 3.8 to 4.9 percentage points.1 Similarly, in 
Vietnam, Nguyen found that enrolment in VHI leads to 
an increase in the number of outpatient and inpatient 
visits by approximately 0.914 and 0.078, respectively.21 
Our results could be related to the fact that according 
to the Revised HI Law 2014, the poor are entitled to 
100% free of user fees, and the near- poor—95%, thus 
may reduce financial barriers to medical service utilisa-
tion.37 For VHI groups, contributions are based on the 
family's unit subscription, which reduces premiums for 
household members. The inability to pay the premium 
is one of the significant determinants of low uptake of 
VHI in Vietnam.38 Before the Revised HI law was intro-
duced, the HI premium for the VHI group participants 
was 6% of the minimum salary. However, after the Revised 
HI law has been enacted, the family- based contribution 
has been introduced where the premium of the first 
member is 4.5% of the minimum salary. The premiums 
of the second, third, fourth and fifth members are 70%, 
60%, 50% and 40% of the first member’s contribution.37 
A decreased HI premium is also likely to remove barriers 
to access to health facilities, and therefore, increasing the 
rate of services utilisation for both outpatient and inpa-
tient care.
Outcome variable
(in last 12 months)
Matching 
algorithm
VHI subsample Heavily subsidised subsample Full sample
ATT 95% CI ATT 95% CI ATT 95% CI
  Before 
matching
1022 760 1204 760 4106 760
After matching NN 575 760 480 760 750 760
Kernel 1002 760 1173 760 4093 760
Radius 1002 760 1173 760 4093 760
ATT—the average treatment effect on the treated; ATT after performing PSM and bootstrap were presented. SEs in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
NN, nearest- neighbour matching; PSM, propensity score matching; VHI, voluntary health insurance.
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The increase in healthcare service utilisation might also 
reveal that the vulnerable groups experience a higher 
burden of disease or that there might be some moral 
hazard involved.39–41 In particular, in our study the partic-
ipants in HSHI programmes had higher self- reported 
illness days (4.98 illness days per year—table 2) than 
those without HI (1.52 illness days per year). The study 
of Minh showed a substantial moral hazard among the 
insured older group, with 1.45 visits per year on average 
compared with 0.39 times among the uninsured.39 In addi-
tion, the popularity of fee- for- service payment method 
that has not been adjusted much in the Revised HI Law 
might also be the reason for increased visits of health 
facilities in Vietnam. Indeed, this method triggers supply- 
induced demand problem, which means that healthcare 
providers can give needless diagnosis and treatment to 
patient.6 7 42 In a qualitative study, Minh and Löfgren42 
documented: “doctors can determine the diagnosis and 
treatment protocols, and as such, doctors can suggest 
patients undergo numerous high‐tech diagnostic tests 
and therapies, many of which might be not so relevant…, 
the overprovision of tests and therapies and the overuse 
of high‐tech equipment, the increase in patients’ length 
of stay in hospitals is the other tactic hospitals often use to 
generate revenues”.
The study demonstrated that the effect of HI policy 
on the number of outpatient visits was greater than that 
of inpatient visits. This may be because of the fact that 
hospitalisation requires a relative to accompany and care, 
and other indirect costs which are not covered by HI may 
arise such as travel costs, informal costs, or some hospital 
services and medicines, leading to increased out- of- pocket 
expenditures.42 43 Using data from 300 inpatients of 
different hospitals in northern Vietnam, Vuong43 demon-
strated that the probability of falling into debt among the 
insured non- resident patients is approximately 63.3%. In 
contrast, this figure for the insured resident is only 18%. 
Besides, informal payments such as ‘envelopes’ or under‐
the‐table payment are popular in public hospitals in 
Vietnam.42 Concerning accessibility, in a study conducted 
in remote and mountainous areas in Vietnam, Tran et al44 
demonstrated that distance is a risk factor for access to 
health services (OR 3.6, 95% CI 1.5 to 8.3). Therefore, 
the poor and the near- poor or low- income people are 
likely to delay inpatient admissions.
The study showed that HI participation increased 
healthcare services utilisation at district and provincial 
hospital levels of provider, and the impact was higher for 
district hospitals. There are several possible explanations 
for this result. First, this can be explained by the changes 
in the referral system. Before the revised HI Law 2014, 
the insured had to visit healthcare providers designated 
in the HI card; otherwise, they had to pay the full cost 
of the examination. However, after the revised HI Law 
has been enacted, the enrollees can go to any district and 
commune health facility.37 Second, the current provider 
payment system is another possible explanation for 
the findings. The capitation payment method, which is 
implemented differently in Vietnam from international 
features, puts the district hospitals at risk of bearing the 
full cost of referring patients to the higher healthcare 
level; therefore, they try to keep the patients.7 Third, 
changes in copayment are likely to contribute to the 
substantial increase in healthcare utilisation at district 
hospitals. If the insured receive care from the higher level 
without referral letter, they have to pay higher copayment 
rates, for example, 40% of inpatient medical expendi-
tures at provincial hospitals and 60% at central hospitals, 
and they have to pay the full cost of outpatient care.6 37
We observed the intensity of visiting hospitals to be rela-
tively higher for the VHI group than the HSHI group. 
This result also accords with our earlier observations, 
which showed that in Vietnam, the people from the lowest 
quintile and ethnic minorities make up a significant share 
of commune health station visits.7 10 In particular, in my 
study, most the enrollees of the HSHI group are from the 
poorest quintile (36.7%), come from rural areas (85.2%) 
and are ethnic minorities (21.3%) (table 2). In contrast, 
participants of VHI are better- off with around 22.4% 
being from the third quintile group. Besides, approxi-
mately 35.8% of the insured live in urban areas and only 
2.2% of them are ethnic minorities (table 2). There-
fore, the insured of the VHI group have more choices 
of alternative health facilities than those joining HSHI 
programmes and make greater use of hospitals.
The study also found that the HI programme produced 
a substitution effect between public and private health 
facilities. In particular, the decrease in consuming private 
care has been compensated by an increase in consuming 
public care. This might be because, in Vietnam, only a 
small number of private health facilities are covered by 
HI.6 This finding was also reported by Palmer.35
With regard to type of visits, I found that ATTs of HI was 
sensitive to unobserved characteristics for the outcomes 
of frequency of visiting health facility for consultation and 
health check. This result is likely to be related to the fact 
that health check- up is not part of HI benefits package.37 
Besides, although preventive consultation services are 
financed by state budget, investment in the primary care 
level in Vietnam is still modest.10
The most important limitation of this study lies in 
the fact that using the PSM method to measure the 
HI scheme’s causal effect, the estimated results may 
be biased if variables affecting both the outcome and 
treatment status are omitted: unobserved confounders. 
Specifically, the study failed to control supply- side factors, 
such as the quality and availability of health workers, 
attitude of medical staff towards patients, availability of 
medicines and equipment in different health facilities, 
and the number and distribution of healthcare facili-
ties between regions. Other health security problems, 
such as re- emerging communicable diseases, pollution 
and natural disasters, happened around the time of the 
Revised HI Law’s introduction, were also not considered 
in this study. For example, measles and dengue fever 
outbreaks, and A(H5N1) avian influenza in humans 
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occurred in 2014.45 46 Also, the introduction of Govern-
ment Decree 16/ND‐CP 2015 on the autonomy of public 
hospitals, which is likely to be responsible for the increase 
in healthcare service utilisation,42 was not controlled. Bias 
associated with self- reported data is another limitation of 
this study. Finally, the interval after the revision of the 
law may have been short to evaluate its impacts. Future 
research may address these issues using longitudinal data 
with other specifications, such as instrumental variables 
or difference- in- difference.
CONCLUSION
The HI scheme significantly increased both outpatient 
and inpatient healthcare utilisation for different HI 
groups of interest. The findings have several practical 
implications. The government could continue increasing 
HI coverage for low coverage rate groups such as informal 
sector workers, farmers, fishers and other near- poor 
groups by subsidising premium contributions. Besides, 
Vietnam Social Security (VSS) might regularly monitor 
hospitals in terms of drug lists and medical services reim-
bursed by the HI fund to avoid possible supply- induced 
demand problem. The study also found that the effect 
was more marked for the district hospital level of care 
than the provincial level. This finding suggests the govern-
ment could give priorities for the primary level of care by 
investing in health resources, including health workers, 
equipment, medicines and appropriate distribution 
of health facilities to optimise the referral system. The 
results also demonstrated that the participants of the VHI 
group visited hospitals more intensively. This suggests 
that VSS could strengthen monitoring hospitals to ensure 
appropriate examination and treatment. VSS might also 
adjust payment method aiming to combine capitation 
and diagnostic- related group methods. I also found the 
substitution effect of using private health services for state 
health services. There is potential room for reducing the 
overload of tertiary care level by expanding HI contracts 
and enhancing collaboration with the private health 
sector.
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